Plutocrats and their companies have inordinate influence on our supposedly democratic policy-making through the reinforcing combination lobbying, campaign spending, and the revolving door of personnel going back and forth between the private and public sectors. This post focuses on presenting background information on lobbying, how much of it is occurring and who lobbyists are. My next posts will focus on a couple of specific examples of how lobbying works, and then present some ways to control lobbying and curb its use as a tool for undue influence by plutocrats and their companies. Lobbying, by the way, is defined as an individual or organization interacting directly with government officials, either elected ones or employees, in an effort to influence public policy.
In 2018, corporate interests spent more than $2.8 billion (yes, that’s BILLION) on lobbying; that’s more than we spend to fund the entire operation of Congress. More than $58 billion has been spent on lobbying the federal government since 1998; an average of almost $3 billion a year. Currently, there are about 11,000 registered lobbyists in Washington, D.C. [1]
The Lobby Disclosure Act of 1995 requires lobbyists to register if they are:
- Paid to lobby on behalf of a client,
- Make more than one contact with government officials, and
- Spend more than 20% of their time on lobbying and related activities.
In addition to registered lobbyists, lots of “shadow” lobbying occurs by individuals who are paid to lobby but are not registered, either because of loopholes in the law or failure to abide by the law. Conservative estimates are that the number of paid employees who lobby the federal government is at least double the number of registered lobbyists (22,000 instead of 11,000) and some people estimate the number might be close to 90,000.
The registration requirement that 20% of an individual’s time be spent on lobbying and related activities serves as a big loophole. Many unregistered lobbyists claim they don’t spend 20% of their time on lobbying activities. For example, former members of Congress who advise lobbyists and corporate officials who oversee lobbying activity but who infrequently engage in direct lobbying often don’t register. Every year, hundreds of registered lobbyists from one year don’t register as lobbyists the next year even though they remain in the same job or move to a similar job for a different employer. In 2019, 1,621 registered lobbyists from 2018 did not re-register although 769 (47%) of them remained with the same employer and 298 (18%) moved to similar jobs. In addition, giving a glimpse into who goes through the revolving door, 138 (8.5%) of them moved into government jobs.
Enforcement of the Lobby Disclosure Act has been limited. Of 19,705 cases of potential non-compliance reported to the U.S. Attorney for enforcement, only nine violations have been substantiated in 24 years. All of them resulted only in fines.
Despite his pledge to “drain the swamp” in Washington, President Trump has already hired 177 registered lobbyists into his administration in less than three years. Seven of those former lobbyists are in his cabinet running major federal agencies. In comparison, Obama hired 223 lobbyists in eight years and neither he nor President G.W. Bush had as many lobbyists in their cabinets over eight years. In 2018, 138 registered lobbyists left lobbying and took jobs as government employees. [2]
The Members of Congress who leave and go to lobbying firms are another stream of people going through the revolving door. Since January 2011, 176 members of Congress left to go to work influencing public policy, either as registered lobbyists or in other roles. Most of them went to high-profile lobbying firms with addresses on K Street in Washington, D.C., (aka K Street firms) or to the big law firms that engage in lobbying. However, of the 176, only about half (53%) registered as lobbyists. [3]
The thousands of people who leave Congressional staff positions or executive branch agency jobs to become lobbyists represent another stream of people going through the revolving door.
In addition to the influence lobbyists have due to their personal contacts and knowledge of policy and the policy-making process, they also wield influence by giving or raising money for election campaigns. The timing of campaign contributions often coincides with the targeted Congressperson’s active involvement in a policy decision the lobbyist wants to influence. Or contributions may be made around the time of a meeting with a Congressperson, i.e., just before or just after the meeting, apparently to facilitate getting the meeting or as a reward for having the meeting or for commitments made during the meeting.
My next post will present a couple of specific examples of how lobbying works to influence policy. The subsequent post will review some ways to control lobbying and curb its use as a tool for undue influence by plutocrats and their companies.
[1] Evers-Hillstrom, K., & Auble, D., 10/3/19, “‘Shadow lobbying’ in Trump’s Washington,” Open Secrets, Center for Responsive Politics (https://www.opensecrets.org/news/reports/shadow-lobbying-2019#reforms)
[2] Evers-Hillstrom, K., & Auble, D., 10/3/19, see above
[3] Evers-Hillstrom, K., 10/9/19, “Congress to K Street: 176 members left for influence gigs over the last decade,” Open Secrets, Center for Responsive Politics (https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/10/congress-to-k-street-176-members/)
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